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Summary
A key computation underlying perceptual decisions is the
temporal integration of ‘‘evidence’’ in favor of different states
of the world. Studies from psychology and neuroscience
have shown that observers integrate multiple samples of
noisy perceptual evidence over time toward a decision
[1–11]. An influential model posits perfect evidence integra-
tion (i.e., without forgetting), enabling optimal decisions
based on stationary evidence [2, 3, 12]. However, in real-life
environments, the perceptual evidence typically changes
continuously. We used a computational model to show
that, under such conditions, performance can be improved
by means of leaky (forgetful) integration, if the integration
timescale is adapted toward the predominant signal dura-
tion. We then tested whether human observers employ
such an adaptive integration process. Observers had to
detect visual luminance ‘‘signals’’ of variable strength, dura-
tion, and onset latency, embedded within longer streams of
noise. Different sessions entailed predominantly short or
long signals. The rate of performance improvement as a
function of signal duration indicated that observers indeed
changed their integration timescale with the predominant
signal duration, in accordance with the adaptive integration
account. Our findings establish that leaky integration of
perceptual evidence is flexible and that cognitive control
mechanisms can exploit this flexibility for optimizing the
decision process.Results
Numerous studies of perceptual decision-making in psychol-
ogy and neuroscience have shown that human and animal de-
cision-makers integrate multiple samples of noisy ‘‘evidence’’7Co-first authors
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ential model, the drift diffusion model, posits a perfect integra-
tion (i.e., without forgetting) of evidence toward a critical level,
henceforth termed ‘‘decision bound.’’ Crossing the decision
bound triggers the response and hence determines reaction
time [2, 3, 12–14]. When the evidence is stationary (i.e., its
mean does not vary over time), thismodel produces the fastest
decisions for a fixederror rate [1, 2, 15]. Inmost real-life percep-
tual decisions, however, we face changing environments that
yield changes in evidence over time (Figure 1A). Consider a
radar operator who has to decide whether the trace displayed
on the monitor corresponds to amissile, a passenger plane, or
just ‘‘noise’’: the operator has to search for a weak signal that
emerges from a continuous stream of noise, at an unknown
time, and needs to respond to it as soon as she detects the
signal.Henceforth,wewill refer to this situationassignal detec-
tion under nonstationary evidence and temporal uncertainty.
Here, we used a computational model of the decision pro-
cess to show that, in this situation, perfect integration is sub-
optimal, because it results in an excessive level of ‘‘false
alarms’’ due to integration of presignal noise. Instead, we
show that leaky (i.e., forgetful) integration, which limits the
integration of presignal noise, is more suitable, provided that
the decision-maker can adapt the integration time constant
to the typical signal duration (e.g., the typical duration of
the signal emitted by a missile). We simulated a leaky inte-
grator model that detected signals of varying duration in
protracted streams of noise using different integration time
constants (Figure 1B; see also Figure S1 and Supplemental
Experimental Procedures). The time constant corresponded
to the time it took the integrator’s response to a sudden
signal increase (step function) to reach 1 2 (1/e) of its final,
asymptotic value. The model’s detection threshold (the
inverse of sensitivity, not to be confused with the decision
bound shown in Figure S1) decreased as a function of signal
duration in an approximately linear fashion in log-log coordi-
nates [16]. This linear decrease of the logarithm of the
threshold (i.e., the increase of sensitivity) with the logarithm
of signal duration is a hallmark of temporal integration of sen-
sory evidence [1, 4, 17, 18]. Its slope provides an index of the
integration time constant (Figure S1C). For large time con-
stants (approaching perfect integration), the slope was close
to 21. For small time constants (leak approaching 1), the
decrease was shallower, governed by ‘‘probability summa-
tion’’ of correct detection events, rather than temporal integra-
tion [19]. Intermediate time constants yielded slopes between
about 20.3 and 21, like the ones shown in Figure 1B. As
expected, the long time constant was better suited than the
short time constant (i.e., yielded a lower threshold) for detect-
ing the longest signals (compare red and blue lines in Fig-
ure 1B). However, crucially, for the shortest signals, the short
time constant (blue line) was advantageous over the long
time constant (i.e., lower threshold than for red line). Conse-
quently, the threshold versus duration functions produced by
the two different time constants intersected.
If human observers are able to adapt to the statistics of
signal durations to enhance their performance, then they
should, likewise, shift their integration timescale toward the
Figure 1. Model Predictions and Behavioral Detection Task
(A) Example time course of evidence for a detection decision with temporal uncertainty. A ‘‘signal’’ (an increment in the mean level, black line) is superim-
posed onto a continuous stream of random fluctuations (‘‘noise’’) at a random time, resulting in the noisy evidence (gray line). This time course describes any
type of evidence that a decision-maker might integrate (e.g., the luminance of a visual stimulus or the value of a stock). (B) Detection thresholds as a function
of signal duration for a leaky integrator model employing different time constants t. Thresholds correspond to the signal strength yielding a hit rate of 80%.
The decision bound was adjusted for each t to maintain a fixed false alarm rate of 20%. The linear slope on log-log axes provides an estimate of t. See also
Figures S1–S3. (C) Histograms of the signal durations on signal + noise trials during S- and L-sessions of the psychophysical detection task. Observers were
informed about these contingencies at the start of each session. (D) Schematic of the time course of the stimulus during an example signal + noise trial. The
two discs fluctuated in luminance around a common mean level. During the signal interval, the mean luminance level of one of the discs increased (variable
onset latency, magnitude, and duration). The signal is exaggerated for illustration. In the actual experiments, signal strengths were selected to span
observers’ psychophysical detection threshold.
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982typical signal duration. This should be evident in the rate of
observers’ performance (measured in terms of hit rate and
detection threshold, respectively) improvement as a function
of signal duration (Figure 1B): one should find a stronger
improvement when long signals predominate compared to
when short signals predominate. Thus, the hit rate versus
duration functions (and threshold versus duration functions,
respectively) measured under different predominant signal du-
rations should intersect.
To test this prediction, we asked 12 human observers to
detect visual ‘‘signals’’ embedded in a longer ‘‘noise’’ stream
(Figures 1C and 1D; Experimental Procedures). On each
‘‘signal + noise’’ trial, the signal was an increment inmean lumi-
nance level of one of two fluctuating discs, which occurred at
different latencies within the longer noise stream and varied
(across trials) in duration and intensity (Figure 1D). Critically,
we systematically manipulated the typical signal duration
(and, thereby, presumably the observers’ expectation of signal
duration) by presenting either predominantly the shortest or
the longest signal durations within each of a number of
different experimental sessions (henceforth referred to as
‘‘S-’’ or ‘‘L-sessions,’’ respectively; Figure 1C). Observers
were informed about the predominant signal duration at the
start of each session. We hypothesized that they wouldintegrate the difference between the two input streams on
the left and right, respectively, and respond whenever this
accumulated difference surpassed one of two symmetric deci-
sion bounds (a positive and negative one for left and right,
respectively). More importantly, we further hypothesized that
observers would employ a longer integration timescale in the
L- than in the S-sessions.
This is what we found (Figures 2 and 3). All observers per-
formed the task with low rate of false alarms (mean across
observers: 14%; range: 8%–24%) and other errors (Table
S1). Across the group, there was no significant difference in
false alarms between L and S sessions (t11 = 0.94; p = 0.36).
Hit rates increased monotonically with signal duration, indi-
cating temporal integration of the signal. Importantly, for the
shortest signals (150 ms), hit rates were significantly higher
in the S- than in the L-sessions, while the opposite was the
case for the longest signals (900 ms; Figure 2). Accordingly,
in signal trials, there was a highly significant interaction
between the session type (L versus S) and signal duration
(two-way repeated-measures ANOVAwith factors signal dura-
tion and session type; F3,33 = 17.91; p < 10
23). This interaction
was not evident in the reaction times (RTs). Although RTs
increased with signal duration (main effect of signal duration:
F3,33 = 6.81; p = 0.02; effect of session type: F3,33 = 2.32;
Figure 2. Interacting Effects of Expectation and Signal Duration on Hit Rate
Reveal Adaptation of Integration Time Constant
The group average (n = 12) of proportion of correct choices for the noise-
only trials and signal + noise trials are shown separately for the different
signal durations and for L-sessions (red) and S-sessions (blue). For noise-
only trials, numbers correspond to the correct rejection rate (no response).
For signal + noise trials, numbers correspond to hit rates, collapsed across
the five different signal strengths. Solid lines, average prediction of best-
fitting leaky integrator model; dashed lines, average prediction of best-
fitting drift diffusion model; error bars represent 95% confidence intervals;
***p < 1023 (paired t test). See also Figure S2 and Tables S1–S3.
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983p = 0.15), there was no statistically significant interaction
between signal duration and session type (F3,33 = 0.9;
p = 0.45). Therefore, we focused our subsequent analyses on
the accuracy data.
The behavioral results in Figure 2 indicate that observers
indeed changed their integration time constant, depending
on which signal duration predominated in a given session.
We used two complementary approaches to quantify this
effect and link it to our theoretical predictions. First, we
compared alternative computational models of the decision
process in their ability to account for the observers’ behavioral
data (i.e., the false alarm rates, and the hit rates as a function of
signal strength and duration; Figures 2 and S2; Tables S2 and
S3). One class of models incorporated our theoretical predic-
tions: a leaky integrator, the timescale of which was free to
vary with the session type (see Supplemental Experimental
Procedures). This model provided a reasonable account of
the psychophysical data (solid lines in Figure 2; see Figure S2A
and Table S2 for individual observers). The integration
time constants estimated by this model were consistently
longer for L- than for S-sessions (group average: S: 80 ms;
L: 490 ms; Wilcoxon signed-rank test: 1023).
The variant of the leaky integrator model shown in Figure 3
had different parameters for the internal ‘‘noise’’ in both
session types and for an exponent describing the nonlinear
relationship between physical signal intensity and neuronal
input to the integrator at the decision stage. A simpler variant
of this model, without these additional parameters, provided
qualitatively identical results (Figure S2B).
We also fitted a perfect integrator (drift diffusion) model to
the behavioral data (Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
As expected, this model (dashed lines in Figure 2) consistentlyprovided a worse performance level (low correct rejection
rates for noise-only trials) and a worse account of the data
(underestimation of hit rate at short signals and overestimation
of hit rate at long signals) than the leaky integrator model with
variable time constant (see Figure S2A and Table S3 for
individual observers). Quantitative model comparison was
consistently in favor of the leaky integrator model (Table 1).
The difference in the Bayesian information criterion (BIC,
which takes into account both the goodness of fit and the
number of model parameters) values, ranged between 82
and 766 across observers, providing strong support for the
leaky integrator. In sum, fitting alternative models of the deci-
sion process strengthens the case for leaky integration with
adaptive timescale.
In the second, model-independent approach, we estimated
observers’ psychophysical detection thresholds for all signal
durations (see Figure 3A for an example observer; Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures). For all observers individu-
ally (Figure S3A), as well as for the group (Figure 3B), the
thresholds were approximately linear in duration (in log-log
coordinates). Just as for the model in Figure 1, the slopes of
observers’ empirical threshold versus duration functions
depended on the expected signal duration (Figures 3B and
3C and Figure S3A). Slopes were significantly larger (i.e.,
more negative) in the L- than S-sessions in nine of the 12 indi-
vidual observers (p < 0.05; one-sided permutation test).
Further, the difference in slopes was highly significant when
tested for the group (Wilcoxon signed-rank test; p < 1023; Fig-
ure 3C). We obtained qualitatively similar results when using
an alternative, more constrained, approach for estimating the
slopes of the threshold versus duration functions (see Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures and Figures S3B–S3D).
Taken together, our results provide strong and comple-
mentary support for our hypothesis that observers changed
their integration timescale with the predominant signal dura-
tion, in line with a decision process employing an adaptive
timescale.
Discussion
The temporal integration of pieces of evidence supporting
different choice options is a fundamental computational pro-
cess underlying all decisions. This process operates during
perceptual decisions like the one studied here [1–11], as well
as during valued-based, economic decisions (e.g., a stock-
buyer choosing stock options by integrating their fluctuating
values) [14, 17, 20]. Here, we show that under conditions of
nonstationary evidence with temporal uncertainty, perfect
evidence integration is suboptimal and is not the computation
employed by human decision-makers. To this end, we used an
experimental protocol, which, albeit still far from real-life deci-
sions, extends the standard laboratory tasks used for probing
evidence integration in an important way. Our results demon-
strate that human observers can boost their decision perfor-
mance by flexibly changing the timescale of a leaky integration
process according to changes in the expected signal duration.
Our estimates of integration timescales showed a consistent
separation between long and short expected signals. But
these timescales also varied substantially across observers
and tended to be shorter than the actual duration of the typical
signal, especially during the S-sessions. One possible expla-
nation for the latter is that, in the S-sessions, some observers
may have based their decision, in addition to the integrated
signal, on transient responses at signal on- and offsets (see
A B
C
Figure 3. Change of Psychophysical Thresholds
with Signal Duration Reveals Adaptation of
Integration Time Constant
(A) Psychometric functions of one example
observer, separately for the four signal durations
and two session types. Psychophysical detection
thresholds (expressed in units of signal-to-noise
ratio; SNR) decreased with duration but more
strongly in L- than in S-sessions. Solid lines,
best-fitting cumulative Weibull functions. Vertical
dashed lines indicate location of threshold
parameter on the x axis. Error bars represent 95
% bootstrap confidence intervals. (B) Group
average thresholds, plotted on log-log scales as
a function of signal duration. Error bars represent
SEM. Lines, group average of the individual
regression fits. (C) Individual (thin lines) and
group average (thick black line), best-fitting
regression slopes for S- versus L-sessions. The
absolute value of the slopes is shown (all fitted
individual slopes were negative; see Figure S3A).
The thin black thin line corresponds to the
observer shown in (A). See also Figure S3.
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tion of the interindividual variability in the performance of our
12 observers may reflect differences between strategies (or
integration capacities) among individuals. Future studies
should examinemore complexmodels of the decision process
to capture such individual differences.
Our results have a number of implications for understanding
themechanisms of decision-making. First, they provide strong
support for models of perceptual choice that are based on
leaky, rather than perfect, integration of perceptual evidence.
The notion of leaky integration is inspired by fundamental prin-
ciples of neural computation [4, 18], and it is consistent with
neurophysiological data suggesting a reservoir of time con-
stants in the cerebral cortex [21, 22]. Leaky integration is
also consistent with a common finding in psychophysical
experiments, which manipulated the stimulus duration and
hence available decision time, showing that observers inte-
grate sensory evidence only across limited periods of time
([8, 10, 11, 23, 24], but see [8] for an alternative interpretation
involving perfect integration). While information leak has so
far been regarded as a limitation in perceptual decision-
making, our results reveal that it is, in fact, advantageous for
real-life decisions: the integration timescale provides a critical
degree of freedom for adapting the decision process to the
environmental contingencies. Similar conclusions have been
reached for the temporal integration of reward (across trials)
in a dynamic foraging task, in whichmonkeys used a time con-
stant that was closely matched to the statistics of the environ-
ment [25]. However, in this study, the optimal timescale was
not systematically manipulated.
Our results also shed new light on the question of how ‘‘top-
down’’ cognitive control mechanisms shape decision compu-
tations [26]. Since the emergence of signal detection theory in
perceptual psychophysics [16], perceptual decision-making
has been viewed as a two-component process: (1) the encod-
ing and integration of sensory evidence and (2) the criterionlevel (decision bound), against which
the integrated evidence is compared
to reach a decision. In this view,
decision-makers exert control over the
decision process only by adaptingthe decision bound [1–3, 27, 28], while the evidence integration
operates automatically. By contrast, our results reveal that
adaptive control mechanisms can directly shape the evidence
integration computation.
Further, the results imply that the brain is remarkably flex-
ible in selecting an integration timescale suitable for the envi-
ronmental context at hand. Timescales of several hundreds
of milliseconds, like the ones observed here, are probably
an emergent property of dynamic network interactions rather
than a fixed property of individual neurons [4, 18, 24]. Physi-
ological evidence suggests that such network interactions
during decision-making span multiple regions that are widely
distributed across the brain [29–31]. The adaptive changes in
integration timescales found in the present study may, there-
fore, reflect the flexible adjustment of such large-scale deci-
sion networks, which might be achieved by neuromodulation
[32–34].
Finally, our study sets the stage for future neurophysiolog-
ical studies of the biophysical circuit mechanisms underlying
perceptual evidence integration. Such studies could exploit
our experimental protocol to experimentally manipulate inte-
gration timescale, while characterizing neurophysiological
signatures of the evidence integration mechanism [22, 29].
Experimental Procedures
Below, we describe the psychophysical experiments and provide a brief
summary of the psychometric fitting procedures. All data analysis and
modeling procedures are described in detail in the Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures.
Observers
Twelve healthy observers (eight females, age range: 20–37 years, normal or
corrected-to-normal vision) participated in this study after informed
consent. The observers were psychology students at TAU, who were naive
to the purpose of the study, did the experiment for credit, and were, in
addition, paid for their participation in proportion to task performance
(20–40 NIS per hr). The study was approved by the local ethics committee.
Table 1. Comparison between Leaky and Perfect Integrator Models
Observer Perfect Integrator Leaky Integrator Leaky Better?
1 468.06 298.32 TRUE
2 596.55 263.14 TRUE
3 527.07 300.60 TRUE
4 505.74 278.92 TRUE
5 436.49 244.50 TRUE
6 483.94 313.87 TRUE
7 1,144.75 379.02 TRUE
8 737.00 358.21 TRUE
9 1,016.56 494.46 TRUE
10 346.15 263.81 TRUE
11 470.75 332.18 TRUE
12 624.11 445.98 TRUE
Values correspond to Bayesian information criterion (BIC). BIC differences
perfect integrator 2 leaky integrator of >6 are considered strong support
for the leaky integrator model.
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Stimuli were presented on a linearized CRT screen (frame rate: 100 Hz). On
each trial, two discs were presented in the right and left visual hemifields
on a black background, for a total duration of 5 s (Figure 1C). Discswere pre-
sented at an eccentricity of 5 and subtended about 2.85 of visual angle.We
controlled the level of (external) noise entering the decision process by
randomly and independently changing each disc’s luminance level at each
monitor refresh (10 ms). These random luminance fluctuations were drawn
from a truncated Gaussian noise (SD after truncation = 0.11), and they
were added to each disc’s mean luminance level. The truncation was used
to prevent the luminance variable to exceed the (0,1) boundaries (see below).
Throughout each trial, the mean luminance level had one of two values.
Twenty-five percent of the trials (‘‘noise-only’’ trials) contained only fluctua-
tions around the same baseline level (0.40, on a 0–1 scale). This was con-
structed by using RGB values with equal components. In the remaining
75% (‘‘signal + noise’’ trials), both discs fluctuated around the samebaseline
level for most of the trial, and a luminance increment was added to the base-
line level of one of the discs at various different latencies within the noise
stream (uniform distribution of signal onsets; range: 0.6–3.5 s). This incre-
ment was the signal that observers had to detect. The signal’s location
(left or right), strength (0.08, 0.16, 0.24, 0.32, or 0.40), and duration (150,
300, 600, or 900 ms) were randomly selected on each signal + noise trial.
Procedure
Observers’ task was to maintain fixation throughout the whole trial and to
respondwhenever they judged that one of the discs had increased in bright-
ness (the signal; Figure 1D). They had to indicate the location of the signal by
pressing a left or a right button within a predetermined response window
(from signal onset to 600 ms after signal offset). Responses to signals
were classified as correct (‘‘hits’’) if they weremadewithin the responsewin-
dow and with the correct button. There were four possible types of errors:
‘‘false alarms’’ (response on noise-only trials or before the response window
on signal + noise trials), ‘‘slow responses’’ (response on signal + noise trials
after the response window), ‘‘misses’’ (no response whatsoever on signal +
noise trials), or ‘‘mislocalization’’ (response on signal + noise trials within
response window but with incorrect button). At the end of ‘‘mislocalization’’
trials, a sound feedback was provided. At the end of the other error trials, a
text on the screen informed observers about the type of error. After the
completion of each trial, observers pressed a key to continue to the next
trial. In the absence of any key press, the next trial started automatically
after 2.5 s. Every 100 trials, observers were allowed to pause.
After a short practice session, each observer performed several experi-
mental sessions of 500 trials each (duration:w1 hr). All sessions consisted
of 125 noise-only trials and 375 signal + noise trials. To manipulate the
observers’ expectation of signal duration, we introduced a predominance
of a factor of two (rate of occurrence: 0.4 versus 0.2) of either the longest
or the shortest signal duration over the other three durations (Figure 1C).
In one type of session (‘‘S-sessions’’), there were 150 trials (5 signal
strengths 3 30 trials) of the shortest duration (150 ms). In the other type
of session (‘‘S-sessions’’), there were 150 trials of the longest duration
(900 ms). In all sessions, there were 75 trials (5 signal strengths 3 15 trials)
of the remaining three durations (see Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures for rationale behind these distributions of signal durations.)The two types (S/L) were alternated from session to session, with the
order counterbalanced across observers. Observers received an explicit
instruction about each session’s type before the start of testing. Nine
observers performed four sessions. Three observers performed six
sessions.
Data Analysis and Model Fits
We computed observers’ psychophysical detection performance as the
percentage of hits on signal + noise trials, separately for each signal dura-
tion and intensity, and as the percentage of no responses (‘‘correct rejec-
tions’’) on noise-only trials (Figure 2). We fitted two different classes of
computational models of the decision process (leaky integrator and drift
diffusion) to the complete performance data of each individual observer
(including noise-only trials). To estimate observers’ detection thresholds,
we fitted a cumulative Weibull function to the hit rates as a function of signal
strength and extracted the threshold parameter of the best fits (Figure 3).
See Supplemental Experimental Procedures for details of the data analysis
and model fitting procedures.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures, three figures, and three tables and can be found with this article
online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2013.04.039.
Acknowledgments
We thank Michael Herrmann for helpful discussions on the computational
model. M.U. is funded by the Israeli Science Foundation (grant: 743/12)
and by the German Israeli Foundation (grant, 1130-158.4/2010).
Received: November 22, 2012
Revised: April 11, 2013
Accepted: April 15, 2013
Published: May 16, 2013
References
1. Bogacz, R., Brown, E., Moehlis, J., Holmes, P., and Cohen, J.D. (2006).
The physics of optimal decision making: a formal analysis of models of
performance in two-alternative forced-choice tasks. Psychol. Rev. 113,
700–765.
2. Gold, J.I., and Shadlen, M.N. (2007). The neural basis of decision
making. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 30, 535–574.
3. Smith, P.L., and Ratcliff, R. (2004). Psychology and neurobiology of
simple decisions. Trends Neurosci. 27, 161–168.
4. Usher, M., and McClelland, J.L. (2001). The time course of perceptual
choice: the leaky, competing accumulator model. Psychol. Rev. 108,
550–592.
5. de Lange, F.P., Jensen, O., and Dehaene, S. (2010). Accumulation of
evidence during sequential decision making: the importance of top-
down factors. J. Neurosci. 30, 731–738.
6. Donner, T.H., Siegel, M., Fries, P., and Engel, A.K. (2009). Buildup of
choice-predictive activity in human motor cortex during perceptual
decision making. Curr. Biol. 19, 1581–1585.
7. Gold, J.I., and Shadlen, M.N. (2000). Representation of a perceptual
decision in developing oculomotor commands. Nature 404, 390–394.
8. Kiani, R., Hanks, T.D., and Shadlen, M.N. (2008). Bounded integration in
parietal cortex underlies decisions even when viewing duration is
dictated by the environment. J. Neurosci. 28, 3017–3029.
9. van Ravenzwaaij, D., van derMaas, H.L., andWagenmakers, E.J. (2012).
Optimal decision making in neural inhibition models. Psychol. Rev. 119,
201–215.
10. Tsetsos, K., Gao, J., McClelland, J.L., and Usher, M. (2012). Using time-
varying evidence to test models of decision dynamics: bounded diffu-
sion vs. the leaky competing accumulator model. Front Neurosci. 6, 79.
11. Gao, J., Tortell, R., and McClelland, J.L. (2011). Dynamic integration of
reward and stimulus information in perceptual decision-making. PLoS
ONE 6, e16749.
12. Ratcliff, R., andMcKoon, G. (2008). The diffusion decisionmodel: theory
and data for two-choice decision tasks. Neural Comput. 20, 873–922.
13. Roitman, J.D., and Shadlen, M.N. (2002). Response of neurons in the
lateral intraparietal area during a combined visual discrimination reac-
tion time task. J. Neurosci. 22, 9475–9489.
Current Biology Vol 23 No 11
98614. Krajbich, I., and Rangel, A. (2011). Multialternative drift-diffusion model
predicts the relationship between visual fixations and choice in value-
based decisions. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 108, 13852–13857.
15. Wald, A., andWolfowitz, J. (1948). Optimum characteristic of sequential
probability ratio test. Ann. Math. Stat. 19, 326–339.
16. Green, D.M., and Swets, J.A. (1966). Signal Detection Theory and
Psychophysics (New York: Wiley).
17. Busemeyer, J.R., and Townsend, J.T. (1993). Decision field theory: a
dynamic-cognitive approach to decision making in an uncertain envi-
ronment. Psychol. Rev. 100, 432–459.
18. Wang, X.J. (2002). Probabilistic decision making by slow reverberation
in cortical circuits. Neuron 36, 955–968.
19. Watson, A.B. (1979). Probability summation over time. Vision Res. 19,
515–522.
20. Tsetsos, K., Chater, N., and Usher, M. (2012). Salience driven value inte-
gration explains decision biases and preference reversal. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. USA 109, 9659–9664.
21. Bernacchia, A., Seo, H., Lee, D., and Wang, X.J. (2011). A reservoir of
time constants for memory traces in cortical neurons. Nat. Neurosci.
14, 366–372.
22. Honey, C.J., Thesen, T., Donner, T.H., Silbert, L.J., Carlson, C.E.,
Devinsky, O., Doyle, W.K., Rubin, N., Heeger, D.J., and Hasson, U.
(2012). Slow cortical dynamics and the accumulation of information
over long timescales. Neuron 76, 423–434.
23. Burr, D.C., and Santoro, L. (2001). Temporal integration of optic flow,
measured by contrast and coherence thresholds. Vision Res. 41,
1891–1899.
24. Uchida, N., Kepecs, A., and Mainen, Z.F. (2006). Seeing at a glance,
smelling in a whiff: rapid forms of perceptual decision making. Nat.
Rev. Neurosci. 7, 485–491.
25. Sugrue, L.P., Corrado, G.S., and Newsome, W.T. (2004). Matching
behavior and the representation of value in the parietal cortex.
Science 304, 1782–1787.
26. Miller, E.K., and Cohen, J.D. (2001). An integrative theory of prefrontal
cortex function. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 24, 167–202.
27. Botvinick, M.M., Braver, T.S., Barch, D.M., Carter, C.S., and Cohen, J.D.
(2001). Conflict monitoring and cognitive control. Psychol. Rev. 108,
624–652.
28. Lo, C.C., and Wang, X.J. (2006). Cortico-basal ganglia circuit mecha-
nism for a decision threshold in reaction time tasks. Nat. Neurosci. 9,
956–963.
29. Donner, T.H., Siegel, M., Oostenveld, R., Fries, P., Bauer, M., and Engel,
A.K. (2007). Population activity in the human dorsal pathway predicts
the accuracy of visual motion detection. J. Neurophysiol. 98, 345–359.
30. Pesaran, B., Nelson, M.J., and Andersen, R.A. (2008). Free choice
activates a decision circuit between frontal and parietal cortex. Nature
453, 406–409.
31. Siegel, M., Donner, T.H., and Engel, A.K. (2012). Spectral fingerprints of
large-scale neuronal interactions. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 13, 121–134.
32. Aston-Jones, G., and Cohen, J.D. (2005). An integrative theory of locus
coeruleus-norepinephrine function: adaptive gain and optimal perfor-
mance. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 28, 403–450.
33. Eckhoff, P., Wong-Lin, K.F., and Holmes, P. (2009). Optimality and
robustness of a biophysical decision-making model under norepineph-
rine modulation. J. Neurosci. 29, 4301–4311.
34. Usher, M., and Davelaar, E.J. (2002). Neuromodulation of decision and
response selection. Neural Netw. 15, 635–645.
